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Popular assumptions about distributive predicates and implicit arguments 
interact to predict incorrect tmth conditions for sentences in which a predi­
cate takes both an implicit argument and an overt distributive argument. 
This paper argues that the conflict provides evideu.ce for a particular 
approach to argument st:ructu.re and in parti.cular to the semantics of implicit 
arguments: namely, a "neo-DavicJsonian" � in which thematic roles 
are 8D8lyzed as relations between events and iDdividuals, and existentialJy 
interpreted implicit arguments do not appear in the syntax or in logical 
representation at all. The effect of implicit argumeats is produced through 
the use of meaning postulates guaranteeing that any atomic event of a given 
type must bear the appropriate thematic te1ation to some individual. 
1. Two types of implicit argument. 
Implicit arguments come in at least two distinct types. The claims of this 
paper should be understood as applying to only one of these types, 
specifically, to EXISTEN'I1AlLY QUANIlFIED implicit arguments. No cla.im is made 
about the separate category of DEICTIC implicit arguments. 
A few examples should make the distinction clear. Perhaps the best 
known and most studied example of an implicit argument is the implicit 
agent of a short passive, as in (1): 
(1) John was killed. 
Here, the agent of the killing is left unmentioned, but we know that if John 
was killed, there had to be someone or something that killed him. 
Moreover, the agent is systematically expressed in related constructions like 
the long passive in (2) and the active in (3): 
(2) John was killed by someone or something. 
(3) Someone or something killed John . 
• 
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It is somewhat of a fudge to call the implict argument here an AGENT. since 
John could have been killed by something with no agentivity at all , such as 
a falling branch; but it is convenient to use this label anyway t and I will do 
so throughout this paper. 
With few exceptions, the implicit agent of a short passive is interpreted 
as existentially quantified. 1 That is, a short passive sentence is interpreted 
as though there were a variable in the argument place of the implicit agent, 
bound by an existential quantifier. For example, sentence (1) is interpreted 
essentially as in (4): 
(4) ax kiU(x, J) 
The sentence is true DO matter who or what killed Jobo, as long as 
so:mething did; the implicit argument does not refer to a particular individual, 
but instead is existentially quantified. 
We have a similar interpretation for the implicit object argument of the 
detransitivized version of the verb eat. as in (5): 
(5) John ate. 
In this case the interpretation is like that of the formula in (6). once again 
with an existential quantifier: 
(6) 3x eat(i, x) 
At; 10Dg as John ate SOMETHJNG, the sentence is true; the implicit argument 
does not refer to a particular thing, but instead is like a variable bound by 
an existential quantifier. 
We should distinguish this sort of implicit argument from implicit 
arguments which receive a DPlcrJC interpretation. At; an example, consider 
the implicit than argument in a comparative constnlction.. as illustrated in 
(7): 
lin a few odd cases, the implicit agent of a short passive seems to be interpreted 
deicticaUy rather than existeatiaUy. For example, seDlcllCe (i) seems better paraphrased as (ii) 
than as (w); 
(i) The traps were avoided. (ii) The pragmatical1y relevant individual(s) avoided the traps. 
(Ui) There is someone or something that avoided the traps. 
No explanation of this fact will be offered here, although the questions such examples raise are 
fascinating. 
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(7) John is stronger. 
Sentence (7) doesD:t just mean that there is SOMETHING that John is stronger 
than - in this case it would be almost trivially true. Instead, it means that 
John is stronger than some pmgmatically cJetermmed individual or measure 
of stnmgth. For examplet in some contexts it might mean that John is 
stronger than Bill; in other contexts it might mean that he is stronger than 
his own previous level of strength; but in any case it does not have a 
meaning like the formula in (8): 
(8) ax stronger-tban(j t .:r)] 
Likewise, the implicit location argument of a verb like arrive does Dot 
receive an existential interpretation. Sentence (9), for example, means that 
John arrived at the pragmatically relevant location; it doesn't just mean that 
he arrived somewhere, as in the formula in (10): 
(9) John arrived. 
(10) 31 arril'e(i, 1) 
I will have nothing to say in this paper about "why some implicit 
arguments are interpreted one way and others are interpreted differently, 
although this is a very interesting question. The distinction between deictic 
and existential implicit arguments will be of importance mainly in that the 
problems outlined below arise ODly in connection with existentially quantified 
implicit arguments, and Dot in coonection with deictically interpreted implicit 
arguments. We will set deictically interpreted implicit arguments aside and 
concern ourselves only with existentially quantified implicit arguments. 
2. Two analyses of implicit arguments. 
How can a formal malysis give the effect of an existentially quantified 
implicit argument? The most venerable approach is probably a syntactic ODe: 
The implicit argument is taken to be an actual noun phrase, semantically 
equivalent to someone or something. To explain why we can't hear this 
noun phrase when someone utters John was killed or John ale, we claim 
either that the noun phrase is phonologically empty. or else that it is present 
only at some more abstract level of representation. 
An alternative approach is to deny that implicit arguments appear as 
separate constituents in the syntax at all. Instead. the existential quantifica-
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tion associated with implicit arguments is taken to form part of the internal 
semantics of the predicate itself. We understand the passive form. of a verb 
to be a different predicate from the active form; likewise, detrans:itive forms 
are different predicates from their transitive counterparts. We can then give 
a rule like (l l), defining the passive form of a verb in terms of its active 
counterpart, or a nde like (12). defining a detransitivized verb in terms of 
its tnmsitive counterpart: 
( 1 1) If a is a verb t:ranslatiDg as a', md apas is the passive form of a, 
then � trans1ates as Ay3.m' (x, y). 
(12) If a is a verb tDDslating as a', aDd acleuaDs is the detransitivized form 
of a, then adetrlms translates as �'(x, y). 
Rules essentially like these can be found in Bach (1980) or Dowty (1982), 
for example. 
The usual arpmeDt for adopting this kind of analysis is that it explains 
why existentially quantified implicit arguments must take narrow scope with 
respect to overt quantifiers in the sentence. Normally, a noun phrase 
expressing existential quantification may take wide or narrow scope; so 
sentence (13), for example, seems to have a wide-scope reading which 
requires that everyone was killed by the same person, in addition to a 
narrow scope reading which allows different killers for the different victims. 
(13) Everyone was killed by a crazy guy with a gun. 
Of course it is possible to deny that there is an ambiguity here, since the 
first reading is a special case of the second, but we may set this issue aside; 
the point is not that the wide scope reading exists, but that even if it does 
exist, it is NOT available for existentially quantified implicit arguments. So 
even if (13) has a reading like (14), sentence (IS) does not. This can only 
mean something like (16), with narrow scope for the existential quantifier. 
(14) :lxVy kiU(x, y) 
(IS) Everyone was killed. 
(16) Vy3x kilI(x, y) 
Given a rule like ( 1 1) or ( 12) and some very basic assumptions about com­
positiooality, the existential quantifier will never take wide scope over a 
quantifier which forms an independent syntactic element from the predicate, 
and so we explain something that seems rather mysterious on the assumption 
that implicit arguments are actual noun phrases. 
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3. Distributivity. 
Despite their advantages, rules like (11) and (12) tum out to be problematic. 
To see the problems, we must first consider a different kind of example, not 
involving implicit arguments, but something rather d.ifferent., namely overt 
distributive arguments. We will return to implicit arguments in Section 4. 
When a plural noun phrase serves as an argument to a predicate, the 
question arises as to whether this argument is to be interpreted COu..£CTIVELY 
or DJSTR.IBUTIVEL Y • In the case of a collective intepretation, the predicate holds 
of the group denoted by the noun phrase, CODSidered as a whole; it need not 
hold of the individual members of the group. In the case of a distributive 
interpretation, however, there is an entailment that the predicate holds of the 
individual members of the group. For example, sentence (17) meaDS that 
each individual c:hild was asleep, or at least enough of them that any 
exceptions are pragmatically disregardable. In contrast, sentence (18), which 
receives a collective interpretation, does not mean that each individual child 
is numerous, but rather that the entire group of children, considered as a 
whole, has the property of being numerous:2 ' 
(17) The children are asleep. 
(18) The children are numerous. 
How can we account for this difference in interpretatiOD between (17) 
and (18)? It obviously has something to do with a difference in meaning 
between numerous and asleep, so it makes sense to account for it in the 
lexical semantics of these adjectives, for example through the use of a 
meaning postulate like the one in (19): 
(19) asleep(X) .. VyEX asleep(y) 
According to this postulate, a group of individuals is asleep if and only if 
each of the individual members of the group is asleep. We assume such a 
postulate for asleept but not for numerOlLS, and this accounts for the relevant 
difference between the two predicates. 
Before proceeding I would like to address three potential objections to 
the use of meaning postulates like ( 19). First, SOme people may find it 
2Probably a distributive interpretation is available in principle for sentence ( 18) as well, 
but it is ooascnsical. and will not be considered as a possible iatepretation for an actual 
utterance of the sentence except in the most unusual contex:ts. 
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objectionable to suppose that the quantification over members of the group 
here is UNIVERSAL quantification. After all, one can use a sentence like (17) 
even if one or two cbildren are still awake, especially if the total number of 
children is Jarge and it is Dot pragmatic:ally relevant whether every last child 
is asleep. So perhaps what we need is a near-universal quantifier instead of 
a universal one. 
It will hardly matter for the purposes at hand if the quantification does 
tum out to be near-universal instead of universal; the relevant problems will 
come up in either case. Even so, it is perhaps worth citing an argument 
&om Krach (1974, pp. 190-192) that there is 1IIIiversal quantification in this 
sort of example: Seo.te.nces like (20) S01IIld distinctly contIadictory, and in 
this respect differ from conespoading serrteaces like (21), where near­
universal quantification is made explicit. 
(2O)?? Although the children are asleep, some of them are awake. 
(21) Although more or less all the children are asleep. some of them are 
awake. 
Examples like these suggest that lexical distributivity really does involve 
universal quantification, and that to the extent that a sentence like (17) 
allows for some children to be awake, it is because in some circumstances 
these exceptions become pragmatically irrelevant, and not because the truth 
conditions make explicit allowance for such exceptions. 3 
A second possible objection to meaning postulates like (19) is that 
meaning postulates are incapable of handling examples which show an 
ambiguity between collective and distributive interpretatioos. Roberts (1987) 
has given well-known arguments against the use of meaning postulates to 
account for the distributive reading of ambiguious sentences like (22): 
(22) John and Mary built a table. 
This example is ambiguous between a distributive reading where John and 
Mary each built a table, and a collective reading . where they built a table 
3 An inleresting question which this claim sets up is why exceptions arc more easily 
allowed in examples like (17) than in examples like (i): 
(i) AlI the children are asleep. 
Presumably, we · must claim that aU the differs from the in how much pragmatic 
disregardabiliry it can tolerate. I bave no idea how to fonnali2;c the difference. but see Dowty 
(1986) for discussion of related issues. 
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together. Hoeksema (1983) suggested an analysis of this ambiguity in terms 
of "'optional meaning postulates, '" an idea which is very hard to make any 
sense of; Roberts (1987) and Link (1987) suggested the distributivity was due 
instead to an implicit, adverb-like operator on the predicate, an idea which 
is conceptually much less problematic. 
I certai:nly agree that meaning postulates are DOt the way to account for 
the distributive reading of ambiguous examples lik:e (22). But in cases where 
there is DO ambiguity, where the distributive reading is actually :FOR.CED by 
the appearance of a particular predicate, the lexical semantics of the 
predicate seems to be precisely the riaht place to account for the dis­
tributivity. Meaning postulates are a convenient way to describe lexical 
meaning. 
In examples exhibiting an ambiguity between a collective reading and 
a distributive reading, we may follow I...iDk and Roberts and assume that the 
distributive reading is due to an operator on the predicate, essentially as in 
(23): 
(23) Da == A.X'VyfyEX .... a(y)] 
In examples where there is DO ambiguity, and a distributive reading is due 
to the appearance of a particular predicate, we will assume that the 
distributivity is a result of the lexical meaning of the predicate itself rather 
than a separate operator, and will account for that distributivity through the 
use of a meaning postulate similar to that in (19). 
A third objection was raised by James Higginbotham. 4 By using 
meauing postulates in this way, we apparently make a prediction that 
negation must always take scope over the universal quantifier which forms 
part of the lexical meanin.g of the predicate. Thus, a sentence like (24) must 
have a meaning essentially like the formula in (25): 
(24) The children are Dot asleep. 
(25) -'vxE C asleep(x) 
If, for example, the majority of children are asleep, but one or two 
exceptional children are awake, sentence (24) is predicted .to be true. 
However it is DOt immediately clear that a small Dumber of exceptionally 
awake children is really enough to make (24) automatically true. Instead, 
4ln the question period after the talk. 
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in many contexts, (24) seems to imply that all or nearly all the children are 
awake. 
I would suggest that sentences like (24) are actually ambiguous. We 
can obtain the apparently problematic reading by applying the distributivity 
operator to a predicate formed by lambda-abstracting across negation, as in 
(26): 
(26) � -.asleep(x))( C) 
In addition to this readinS, I thiDlc: that (24) does have a reading which 
is accurately rendered by (25). Suppose that John 8Ild Mary have a policy 
of never discussing their cbildraJ. unless they are asleep. One eveoiDg, they 
send the children upstairs to bed. After a while, Mary starts to discuss the 
children's recent behavior. At that very moJDeD1, they hear some noise 
comiDg from upstairs. In this situation, I think John could reasonably and 
ttuthfuIIy say "Wait, the children ateJllOt asleep, lOt even though it may just be 
a single child who is awake. 
Having met these three objections to (19), let us tum to the question 
of how to generalize this sort of approach to other predicates. The meaning 
postulate in (19) is of the general form in (21), and we might actually DEFINE 
distributivity in such a way that a predicate a is distributive if and only if it 
satisfies (27): . 
(27) a(X) .. vyEX a(y) 
However, (27) only deals with one-p1ace predicates. We must also concern 
ourselves with multi-p1ace predicates, and account for distributivity in these 
cases as well. 
A multi-p1ace predicate can be distributive in one argument place 
without being distributive in its other argument places. For example the 
verb kill is potentially collective in its subject argument, but it is always 
distributive in its object argument: you can't kill a group of individuals 
without killing the individuals themselves. Therefore, we need a notion of 
DlSTRJBlJTMIY RELAnvE TO A PARTICULAR. ARGUMENT PLACE, rather than simply 
classifying whole predicates as as either distributive or collective. A first stab 
at defining this notion might look something like (28): 
(28) a is distributive in its ,� argument place iff whenever .xi is plural: 
a(xl ' · · ·..xi' · · ·..xo) .. Vy[yE.xj .... a(xl ' • • •  ,y, . . .  ..xo)] 
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That is, a group can stand in the ;th argument place of a predicate Q if and 
only if each of its individual members stands in that same argument place. 
4. A problem with smpe. 
The definition in (28) seems like a :natural exteasiOIl of (27). However, it 
leads to problematic results when combined with either of the two theories 
of implicit arguments outlined in Section 2, above. Consider sentence (29): 
(29) The soldiers were killed. 
According to the rule for intetpreting passives in (1 1), this sentence should 
get a translation into logical notation like (30). An analysis in which implicit 
arguments are actual noun phrases will presumably yield an equivalent 
representation: 
(30) 3l: kiU(x, S) 
But then, given that kill is distributive in its second argument place, (28) will 
make this equivalent to (3 1): 
(3 1) 3xVy(yES ... kill(x, y)] 
This seems wrong, since it requires the same killer for all the soldiers; it 
does not allow for the possibility that the different soldiers were killed only 
by different agents. What we want is something more like (32), with the 
existential quantifier inside the scope of the universal: 
(32) vy[yES ... 3l: kill(x, y)] 
The source of the problem here is that the existential quantifier comes 
from the rule in (1 1), which effectively just attaches it to the froat of the 
predicate, even while the predicate itself bas a kind of internal universal 
quantifier associated with its distributive argument place. As long as the role 
for interpreting passives takes the predicate as its input. and attaches an 
existential quantifier in front of the predicate, this problem apparently must 
result. This is the case whether we use the actual role in ( 1 1) or instead 
take the implicit argument as an independent noun phrase; neither approach 
has any way of giving the existential quantifier "super-uarrow" scope inside 
the internal. lexical semantics of the predicate, which is what appears to be 
called for. 
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There are various ways we might try to solve this problem. The 
solution I would like to advocate will be presented in Section 5. In the 
remainder of the current section, I would like to consider an alternative that 
was suggested by Barry Schein (personal COJDJDUD.ication). Schein suggests 
that we can maintain that formulas such as (30) are adequate, despite the 
placement of the existential quantifier. The key is to claim that if the 
soldiers were killed, even by dif:ferent agents, then there IS something that 
killed (all) the soldiers. namely the group whose members are all the killers 
of the individual soldiers. For example. if John. killed half the soldiers. and 
Mary killed the other half. then there is some x such that x killed the 
soldiers; namely, the group of John aad Mary is such an x. It looks in that 
case like (30) is not so problematic after all. 
What do we have to do formally to make this work? Schein suggests 
we replace the definition of distributivity in (28) with (33): 
(33) a is distributive in its F arpment place iff: a(xl '0 • •  ,xi, • • •  ,xn)*> Vy 
3Zl' ·· ·..lj.l.lj+ 1 " " ,zJyExi .... [ZI £;;X1 &.. ·&..ci-l �Xi-l & -'i+ 1 �Xi+ 1 & ...  & 
Zn �xn & a(ZI '· . .  .lj.l ,y..lj+ I , . • •  tZu)]] & VZI ' · · · ..lj·I ..lj+ 1 , • • •  tZJY, 
wl' " . ,wi_l'wi+ l , · · ·wn [[Zl Ex1 &·· ·& Zj_1 Exi_l & -'i + l Exi+ l' · · ·....tn Exn] 
.... [yEXi & ZI EWI &· ··&.Zj-l E Wi_1 & -'i+ l EZj+ l & • • . &z.,. E Wn & WI £;;X1 
&" ,&wi--I !;Xi_1 & wi+l  £;;Xi+ l &·· ·&Wn �Xn & a(wI .· · · 'Wi_I 'y'Wi+ l ' · · · 'wn)]] 
As Schein puts it, .... the formula is more complex than the underlying 
intuition. " The effect of (33) is best understood by example: according to 
(33), a sentence like (34) will be true if and ODly if each soldier was killed 
by some subset of the guerillas, and each guerilla was a member of some 
group that killed at least one soldier, as in (35): 
(34) The guerillas killed the soldiers. 
(35) vyES az !; G  a(z, y) & vzE G 3yES 3w� G [zE w & a(w, y)] 
Pelbaps we could quibble with the details here - for instance with the 
requirement that each guerilla has to be a member of some group that kills 
at least one soldier; but such quibbles would be beside the point. The 
crucial fact is that a rule like (33) allows us to .. gather up" the individuals 
that stand in a relation to the members of some group, and say that these 
gathered-up individuals collectively stand in that same relation to the other 
group as a whole. For example we might gather up the individuals that 
killed solider I ,  the individuals that killed soldier 2, the individuals that killed 
soldier 3, and so on, and say that this group of gathered-up individuals killed 
.. the soldiers. " The basic idea idea here is not new; although to my 
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knowledge no one has previously suggested a precise equivalent to (33)� 
interesting comparisons can be made to Lange.ndoen (1978) and Scha (198 1). 
A rule like (33) works well for predicates like IdU. Unfortunately, it 
will not work as a general definition of distn"butivity. Other predicates tum 
out to be problematic. Consider the verb know, for instance, as in to know 
a song. This verb is distributive in its object argument place; you can't 
know some songs unless you know the iDdividual songs themselves. 
However, know does not allow, as a matter of general principle, the kind of 
"gathering up" in subject position that we saw with IdU. Consider the 
following context John is organizing a children's pageant, in which a group 
of children are supposed to perform various songs. Some of the children 
may know some of the songs. and others of the children may know others 
of the songs, and stiIl more of the children may know the rest - so that 
every song is known by at least some of the children; but unless all the 
children know all the songs they are supposed to, at least to the point where 
exceptions become pragmatically irrelevant, John cannot truthfully assert (36): 
(36) The children know the songs. 
One cannot, as a matter of general principle, freely gather up the individuals 
that know subsets of the songs, put them all in a group� and say of that 
group that it knows the songs. Hence (33) is not an accurate characteriza­
tion of the semantics of distributive predicates in general. 
Without (33), agendess passives retain their problematic status. 
Although (36) is false in the context described, it does still seem true in that 
context that every song IS KNOWN, even if not by the right people, so the 
agentless passive sentence (37) is true: 
(37) The songs are known. 
In contrast, the formula in (38) (if. (30» may still be false; the songs may 
be known even if there is no x such that x knows (all) the songs: 
(38) 3x know(x. S) • 
We may conclude that (38) is an inadequate representation of the truth 
conditions of (37), hence that a passive rule like (1 1) is also incorrect, since 
it produces exactly this formula. Once again� the problem is that the passive 
rule gives the existential quantifier associated with the implicit agent 
automatic wide scope over any quantifiers which form part of the internal, 
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lexical semantics of the predicate, including any quantifiers associated with 
distributive argument places. 
Schein suggests that a defender of (33) might meet these objections by 
claiming that in (36). the noun phrase the songs may be intepreted 
contextually as the songs they were supposed to. In addition. the verb 
phrase is modified by a I)..opemtor (see (23», so that the subject is 
inteIpreted. distributively. In this case, the sentence means that each child 
knows the songs he or she is supposed to. Since Jaww is distributive in its 
object argument, this means that each child knows EACH of the songs he or 
she is supposed to, which is more-or-Iess what (36) really means. 
However, we still eDCOUDter some problems. Suppose that the songs 
involve fairly complex choral ammgemaats where the different children. sing 
diffen::Dt parts, even of a given song. In this case, (36) can be true even if 
no child actually kaows a whole song, as IODg as they each know their parts. 
Should we now claim that the songs may be contextually interpreted as those 
portions of the songs they ore supposed to? In my opiDion, this would go 
just too far in allowing a contextual effect on the compositional semantics of 
the noun phrase; we are no longer just restricting the class of songs which 
we quantify over, but instead are completely reinterpreting the sense of the 
noun phrase. 
To conclude: Trying to maintain that the existential quantifier 
associated with implicit arguments really does have wide scope .relative to the 
universal quantifier from distributive arguments is not a very attIactive, or 
perhaps even tenable, position. What we should look for is some way of 
obtaining narrow scope. 
S. Implicit arguments in an eveot-based theory of thematic roles. 
If we assume that implicit arguments are independent noun phrases, or if we 
use rules like (1 1) or ( 12), it is very difficult to see how we could obtain 
sufficiently nanow scope for implicit arguments. However, narrow scope falls 
out almost automatically in the third major way (that I know of) for 
analyzing implicit arguments. This third way involves what is sometimes 
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called a "neo--DavidsoDian'ltS decomposition of verbs into an event predicate 
and a series of thematic relations, as in (39): 
(39) KiU tnmslates as XyMM[kill(e) &. A;GENT(x,e) &. PATIENT(y,e)] 
The idea is that the verb has a conespondiD.g one-place predicate of events; 
the subject and object of the verb are related to these events via thematic 
roles, which are taken to be two-place relations between an event and its 
participants. The evart argidDllmt is normally required to be an existentially 
bound variable, so that senten<::e (40), for example, will teceive the logical 
tnmslation in (41): 
(40) John killed Bill. 
(41) 3e(kiU(e) & AGENT(i, e) &. PATIENT(b, e» 
Once we assume that composition of predicates with their arguments 
is mediated by thematic relations in this fashion, we should define a notion 
of DlSTRlBtrrIV1TY RELATIVE TO A THEMATIC ROLE, rather than retaining our old 
notion of distributivity relative to an argument place. The definition is given 
in (42); � < 'represents the proper part relation on events:6 
(42) a is distributive with respect to 8 iff: 
[a(e) & 8(X. e)] .. V]EX :Ie ' <e[a(e ')  &. 8(y, e)] 
That is, where a predicate a is distributive with respect to a role 8, a group 
X bears role 8 in an a event e if and only if for each member Y of X, e 
SThe 1mn Neo-Davidsoaian is from Dowty (1989). The format of (39) follows 
suuestioas of Parsons (1980, 1985, 1990) u.d !elated work. For our purposes. the crucial 
feature of this decomposition is that it produces • separate logical clause for each lhematic 
role, an idea mniDisceDI. of DaviclsoD'S (1967a) use of sepamte logical clauses for advelbial 
expressions. Some authors appear to lllribute the exrcnsion of this tecbaiquc to thematic roles 
to Davidson himself <e.g. Parsons 1980.p. 33; Chomsky 1981,p. 35; Schein to appear, Ch. 2). 
but as J:>owty points out., Davidson (1967b) actually argued AGAINST this idea, not for it. To 
my knowledge the idea actually origiuatcs with Castaneda (1967), though perhaps • historical 
analogue can be seen in pre�Fregean attempts to reduce transitive SCDleDCCS to simple 
subject/predicate structures. Although CastaDeda argued for the use of separate clauses 
corresponding 10 diffemn thematic roles. he did not explicitly treat thematic roles as relations 
betWccn events and individuaJ$ IS (39) does, nor did he argue for the use of a ODC�place event 
predicate conespondirlg to the verb as in (39); so far IS I know, these ideas originate with 
Parsons (1980). 
�e variable X bere (and throughout) should be understood as ranging over groups 
- which, for the sake of simplicity, we may take to be sets of cardinality 2 or greater. 
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has a smaller subevent e ' as a part, which is also an a event, in which y 
bears 6. , 
For example, IdU is distributive with respect to its patient role, so in 
any event where the soldiers are killed, there will be for each soldier, a 
subevent where that soldier was killed. Of course this should not be taken 
to mean that the soldiers were killed separately, or anything of the sort; even 
if all the soldiers were killed by a single bomb, for example, we may view 
the death of each individual soldier as an event in its own right. 
Because of the separation of thematic relations from the main 
predicate, (42) is able to avoid refererace to any roles other than the one 
being defined as distributive. In this respect it COD.tnIStS with our earlier 
definitions of distributivity in (28) and (33), which were forced to mention 
all the arguments of the predicate, even though it was only the fb argument 
whose status as distributive or ncm..mstnbutive was being considered. This 
feature of (42) will prove very helpful in avoiding some of the problems with 
(28). Suppose that some group of soldiers S is killed in an event e - that 
is, KlLL(e) & PATIENT(S, e). In this case, (42) requires for each 
individual soldier y in S, a corresponding event e ' ,  a part of e, such that 
KlLL(e ') & PATIENT(y, e '). But nothing requires that these smaller 
events corresponding to the individual soldiers must all have the same agent. 
This fact will play a crucia1 role in solving the scope problem for existentially 
quantified implicit arguments. 
The use of a Neo-Davidsonian theory of thematic roles allows an 
interesting account of implicit arguments, significantly different from those 
discussed in Section 2. Parsons (1990) suggests that the clause corresponding 
to an implicit argument may simply be left out of logical traDSlation. For 
example, sentence (43) will receive a representation like (44), with no 
mention of the agent argument at all: 
(43) The soldiers were killed. 
(44) 3e[ki1l(e) & PATIENT(S, e)] 
If passive sentences are to be represented as in (44), we will need a passive 
rule essentially as in (45): 
(45) If a is a verb translating as >"YAxAe[a'(e) & 61(x. e) & 62(y, e)], and 
apas is the passive form of a, then apas translates as >"yAe(a'(e) & 
62(y, e)] . 
The main effect of this rule is just to suppress the subject thematic role. 
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By itself, (45) will not give us an existential interpretation for implicit 
arguments - in fact, it won't give us the effect of an implicit argument at all. 
Consider the formula in (44); by itself, this formula will not guarantee that 
anything killed any of the soldiers; just that they were killed. Of course if 
the soldiers were killed, something must have kiiled them, so we need to say 
something mote. A meaning postulate like (46) will do the trick:: any atomic 
killing event must have an agent. 
(46) Ve[ATOM(kiII, e) ... 3x AGENT(z, e)] 
We define an event as atomic with respect to a predicate as in (47): it DDlSt 
have no proper subevents to which that predicate also applies. 
(47) ATOM(a, e) ... [a(e) & -'3e I <e ' a(e ')] 
The reference to atomic events in (46) is crucial; it should not be required 
that the whole, complex event in which all the soldiers are killed must have 
a single agent, for example. 
It should be noted that (46) is not something special which we invoke 
just for passives or other cases of implicit arguments; something like this is 
needed anyway, if only to say which roles the predicate assigns. It does not 
in any sense form part of the passive rule, which is back in (45); instead, it 
is part of our chanlcterization of the lexical meaning of the verb. 
'Ibis approach to implicit arguments provides a way out of our central 
problem, namely that the existential quantifier associated with an implicit 
argument must take scope over the universal quantifier associated with a 
lexically distributive argument - a problem which seems inevitable in either 
of the approaches outlined in Section 2. In fact, the existential quantifier is 
DOW guaranteed to be effectively inside the scope of the universal, at least 
for any predicate subject to a postulate similar to (46). Suppose that some 
predicate a translates as XYMN(Q'(e) & 81(x, e) & fJ2(y, e)], is distributive 
with respect to fJ2, and subject to the meaning postulate in (48) (if. (46»: 
(48) Ve[ATOM(a', e) ... :Ix 81(x, e)] 
Given an event e and group X such that a'(e) and 82(X, e). the definition 
in (42) will require a proper su'bevent e '  of e such that a( e ') for each of 
the member of X; the larger event e in which the group as a whole 
participates therefore cannot be atomic. Because e is not atomic, (48) will 
not be relevant to detennining if anything bears 81 to it. Regarding the 
smaller events from which this big one is composed, however, any of these 
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which are atomic will be subject to (48); but nothing will require that the 
different atomic events must bear 81 to the same individual. By limiting 
the quantification to atomic events in this way, we allow that The soldiers 
were kille.d could be true even though the killing of each individual soldier 
has its own agent, for example, rather than requiring that there be a single 
agent for the larger, complex everat of killing all the soldiers. Similarly, and 
perhaps more importantly, we allow 1he songs are known to be true even 
if each song is known by its own child or group of children, without 
requiring that there be some group which knows all the songs. 
6. Coadusion.. 
To summarize: If we take implicit arguments to be indepeodeJJt noun 
p1uases, they are assigned too wide a scope. If we use rules like (1 1) or 
(12), whose selling point traditionally bas been that they give narrow scope 
to the existential quantifier associated with implicit arguments, this quantifier 
is still assigned too WIDE a scope with respect to the universal quantification 
associated with lexically distributive arguments. If, however, we assume the 
view of implicit arguments suggested by a neo-Davidsonian decomposition, 
where implicit arguments are completely unrepresented in the logical 
translation and the existential effect is given in the lexical semantics of the 
predicate rather than the rule which suppresses the argument, the right scope 
relations become available. 
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